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Judicial Abatement of the Materiality Requirement in
Denaturalization Proceedings: Eroding the Valued
Rights of Citizenship
To deport one who so claims to be a citizen, obviously de-
prives him of liberty . . . .It may result also in loss of both
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.'
At the close of the Second World War, over eight million per-
sons displaced by the atrocities of the Third Reich sought refuge in
the countries of eastern and western Europe. Those displaced in-
cluded not only civilian refugees from war-torn areas, but also lib-
erated prisoners of war, forced laborers, and those fortunate
enough to survive German concentration and death camps. 2 Pursu-
ant to voluntary repatriation policies established at Yalta in 1945, 3
nearly seven million displaced persons were resettled. By 1948,
however, one million remained homeless. 4 The International Refu-
gee Organization (I.R.O.),5 a United Nation's agency established to
aid in the resettlement of displaced persons, partially alleviated the
problem by organizing temporary camps to shelter over one half of
the remaining displaced population.6
To aid in the relief effort,7 the United States Congress, in 1948,
1 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
2 See S. REP. No. 950, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2028, 2035.
3 The Yalta Conference took place on February 11, 1945, with American President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston L. Churchill, and Soviet General
Secretary Joseph V. Stalin participating.
4 See S. REP. No. 950, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2028, 2035.
5 The Preparatory Commission was established by the Agreement On Interim Meas-
ures To Be Taken In Respect Of Refugees And Displaced Persons, opened for signature Dec.
15, 1946, 61 Stat. 2525, T.I.A.S. No. 1583 (effective Dec. 31, 1946). See Note, Misrepresenta-
tion and Materiality in Immigration Law-Scouring the Melting Pot, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 471, 471
(1980).
6 The I.R.O. Preparatory Commission operated the refugee camps. For a discussion
of the I.R.O., see notes 12 and 14-17 infra and accompanying text.
7 During the late 1930's and early 1940's, when many eventual victims of the Nazi War
machine might have avoided their fate, immigration policy for the United States under
President Roosevelt hampered attempts to seek refuge in the United States. Governed by
1924 immigration legislation establishing restrictive national origin quotas, the United
States took little action to protect those who would suffer the cruelty of Hitler's "Final
Solution." See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 12, 43 Stat. 153, 160-61
(repealed 1952). See also H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1952 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1653, 1671-73; Comment, The Denaturalization of Nazi War
Criminals: Is There Sufficient Justice for Those Who Would Not Dispense Justice?, 40 MD. L. REV. 39,
40-41 (1981) (citing A. MORSE, WHILE SIx MILLION DIED: A CHRONICLE OF AMERICAN APA-
THY 17-22, 28, 37, 60-62, 65, 130, 140, 270-88 (1968) ("The United States not only insisted
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passed the Displaced Persons Act. The Act was emergency immi-
gration legislation making entrance visas into the United States
available for eligible persons.8 Congress, however, having pledged
to ban Axis corroborators from entering the United States, specifi-
cally excluded certain persons from assistance under the Act.9 De-
spite the prohibition, many of the ineligible refugees managed to
immigrate to the United States by misrepresenting or concealing
their wartime activities. Once in the United States, a qualified im-
migrant can apply for American citizenship.' 0 Because the decree
of naturalization, unless revoked, unassailably establishes the natu-
ralized person's citizenship, the otherwise ineligible immigrant is
able to live inconspicuously within the borders of the United States.
Serge Kowalchuk was accused of being one such person. In
1983, a United States district court revoked Kowalchuk's citizenship
and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of naturalization.
The court found that he was not a genuine refugee "of concern" to
the I.R.O., and therefore not entitled to the benefits of the Dis-
placed Persons Act."
This note examines the present state of denaturalization law as
it applies to persons who, like Serge Kowalchuk, were admitted to
the United States under the Displaced Persons Act. Part I discusses
the qualifications for eligibility under the Displaced Persons Act.
Part II outlines congressional authority for regulating immigration.
Part III reviews judicial developments in immigration law, empha-
sizing the requirement of materiality for concealments and misrep-
resentations in immigration proceedings. Part IV analyzes the
plight of persons like Serge Kowalchuk whose false statements pose
questions never before addressed by the Supreme Court. Part V
proposes that the Supreme Court's materiality test for false state-
ments in the citizenship acquisition process should apply to false
statements in visa applications as well. Finally, Part VI concludes
that such an extension ensures that the valued rights of citizenship
are protected from unwarranted revocation.
upon its immigration law throughout the Nazi era, but administered it with severity and
callousness." Id. at 49)). See generally IMMIGRATION As A FACTOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 192
(0. Handlin ed. 1959).
8 Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by Act of
June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. app.
§§ 1951-65 (1951)) (no longer in force).
9 Persons not "of concern" to the Displaced Persons Act included war criminals, per-
sons who assisted the enemy in persecuting civilian populations, and persons who volunta-
rily assisted enemy forces. See notes 16-17 infra and accompanying text.
10 See 3 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAw & PROCEDURE § 20.2c (2d rev.
ed. 1979).
11 See United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 83 (E.D. Pa. 1983), arld, 773 F.2d
488 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986).
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NOTES
I. Eligibility Under the Displaced Persons Act
The United States Congress initially responded to those dis-
placed by the second world war by accepting membership in the
International Refugee Organization in 1947,12 and by enacting the
Displaced Persons Act one year later.13 These actions opened
America's borders to eligible persons displaced by World War II.
A person applying for admission to the United States pursuant
to the Displaced Persons Act had to fulfill several requirements
before a visa was granted. First, the party seeking to immigrate had
to qualify as a displaced person under the I.R.O. 14 Second, the Act
required the applicant to complete an eligibility application. Next,
a staff member of the Displaced Persons Commission (Commission)
would examine the party's applications to determine the applicant's
eligibility under the Act.15 Among other individuals,1 6 the Act ex-
12 See Act ofJuly 1, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-146, 61 Stat. 214. For the legislative history of
the Act, see 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1256. See also Constitution of the Interna-
tional Refugee Organization, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. No.
1846 (entered into force Aug. 20, 1948) [hereinafter cited as LR.O. Const.]. The preamble to
the I.R.O. Constitution states that its purpose is to aid genuine refugees and displaced
persons in returning to their countries of origin or in finding new homes. See id. at 3038.
The I.R.O. Constitution also required participating countries to develop appropriate immi-
gration procedures for the purpose of protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the
refugees. See id. art. 2, § 20), at 3040. It was from this directive that the Displaced Persons
Act was born.
13 Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by Act of
June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. app.
§§ 1951-65 (1951)) (no longer in force). For the legislative history of the Displaced Per-
sons Act, see 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2028; 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2513.
Under the procedures developed by the Displaced Persons Commission, the refugee
had the burden of establishing eligibility for the Act's assistance. See Displaced Persons Act
of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, §, 10, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013, amended by Act ofJune 16, 1950,
Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 9, 64 Stat. 219, 225 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1959
(1951)) (no longer in force). To obtain assistance under the Act, eligible parties had to
apply by December 31, 1951. See Act ofJune 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 4, 64 Stat.
219, 221 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1952 (1951)) (no longer in force).
14 The I.R.O. determined eligibility on the basis of a written application and personal
interview. I.R.O. officials paid special attention in both instances to the applicant's charac-
ter and history. See I.R.O. Const., supra note 12.
15 See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013.
Section two of the Displaced Persons Act incorporated the definition of refugees and dis-
placed persons given in the constitution of the I.R.O. . The definition provides that:
(b) "Displaced person" means any displaced person or refugee as defined in An-
nex I of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization and who is the
concern of the International Refugee Organization.
Id. § 2(b), at 1009. In addition to listing persons who would be "of concern," the I.R.O.
Constitution contained exclusionary language exempting certain applicants. I.R.O. Const.,
supra note 12, at 3051-52.
16 The I.R.O. excluded six classes of persons. In addition to those discussed in the
text, the Act also excluded:
(1) War criminals, quislings, and traitors.
(2) Ordinary criminals who were extraditable by treaty.
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empted any person who: "(a) ... assisted the enemy in persecuting
civil populations of countries [which are] Members of the United
Nations; or (b) .. .voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the
outbreak of the second World War in their operations against the
United Nations."' 7
If the Commission approved the applications, the applicant ap-
plied to an American Consulate for an immigration visa. During
this final stage, a vice-consul would review the completed file, which
contained the I.R.O. certificate and the Displaced Persons Commis-
sion report, and interview the applicant.' 8 If the applicant fulfilled
(3) Persons of German ethnic origin, whether German nationals or members of
German minorities in other countries, who:
(a) had been or would be transferred to Germany from other countries;
(b) had been, during the second world war, evacuated from Germany to other
countries;
(c) had fled from, or into, Germany, or from their places of residence into
countries other than Germany to avoid falling into the hands of Allied
armies.
(4) Persons in receipt of financial support and protection from their country of
nationality, unless their country of nationality requested international assistance
for them.
(5) Persons who, since the end of hostilities in the second war:
(a) had participated in any organization having as one of its purposes the
overthrow by armed force of the Government of their country of origin,
being a Member of the United Nations; or had participated in any terrorist
organization;
(b) had become leaders of movements hostile to the Government of their
country of origin being a member of the United Nations or sponsors of
movements encouraging refugees not to return to their country of origin;
(c) at the time of application for assistance, were in the military or civil service
of a foreign State.
See LR.O. Const., supra note 12, at 3051-52
17 LR.O. Const., supra note 12, at 3031-52. The I.R.O. stated, however, that "[m]ere
continuance of normal and peaceful duties not performed with the specific purpose of aid-
ing the enemy against the Allies or against the civil population of territory in enemy occu-
pation, shall not be considered to constitute 'voluntary assistance.'" Id. at 3052 n.l.
In construing § 2 of the Displaced Persons Act, the Supreme Court stated that:
[W]e are unable to find any basis for an "involuntary assistance" exception in the
language of § 2(a), we [therefore] conclude that the ... plain language of the Act
mandates ... the literal interpretation. . . .Under traditional principles of statu-
tory construction, the deliberate omission of the word "voluntary" from § 2(a)
[and the inclusion of the word "voluntary" in § 2(b)] compels the conclusion that
the statute made all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for
visas.
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512-13 (1981) (citing National R.R. Passengers
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,458 (1974); Botany Worsted Mills
v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)) (emphasis in original) (insert added). The
Court added: "We are not at liberty to imply a condition which is opposed to the explicit
terms of the statute. . . .To [so] hold.., is not to construe the Act but to amend it." Id.
at 513 (quoting Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 38 (1934)).
18 See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013, as
amended by Act ofJune 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 9, 64 Stat. 219, 225-26 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1959 (1951)) (no longer in force). This amendment classi-
fied the duties of a vice-consul and established that the vice-consul had the final determina-
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the immigration requirements, the vice consul would then grant the
applicant a permanent residence visa to the United States. 19 To
discourage false statements on the application, the Act provided
that any person who willfully misrepresented or concealed a fact for
the "purpose of gaining entrance into the United States as an eligi-
ble displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible into the
United States." 20 Despite the provisions of the Act which sought to
exclude war criminals, many otherwise ineligible persons gained
admission into the United States by misrepresenting or concealing
their wartime activities.
II. Congressional Authority and Immigration Procedure
Congress alone has the power to prescribe rules for naturaliza-
tion.21 Thus, courts insist on strict compliance with statutory man-
dates. 22 Congressional authority to regulate immigration, on the
other hand, does not derive from an express constitutional grant; it
is simply regarded as a power inherent to a sovereignty. 23 In 1952,
Congress overhauled the immigration laws by passing the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (1952 Act),24 which established more lib-
tion of an applicant's eligibility. See H. CONF. REP. No. 2187, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2513-23.
19 See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 3, 62 Stat. 1009, 1010. See
generally Note, Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals After Fedorenko, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 169, 172-74 (1982).
20 Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013.
21 Congress derives its power to regulate naturalization from an express provision in
the Constitution which calls on the legislature to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Denaturalization powers are derived from the necessary
and proper clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654
(1946). See also Comment, supra note 7, at 49.
But see Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the power to naturalize does not include the power to denaturalize, as the act of admis-
sion is final):
If this means that some or even many disloyal foreign-born citizens cannot be de-
ported, it is better so than to place so many loyal ones in inferior status. And there
are other effective methods for dealing with those who are disloyal, just as there
are for such citizens by birth.
Id. at 679 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Natural-
ization Power, 80 YALE LJ. 769 (1971).
22 See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981); Polites v. United States,
364 U.S. 426, 436-37 (1960); United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 322 (1917) (cases requir-
ing statutory compliance with legislative enactments as prerequisite to valid naturalization).
See also Note, Fedorenko v. United States: A New Test for Misrepresentation in Visa Applications,
7 N.CJ. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 129, 132 (1982).
23 See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
24 See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, §§ 101-360, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982)). The act reflected the anti-
Communist fervor of the McCarthy era. Although President Truman vetoed the immigra-
tion law because of the severe hardships involving exclusion, deportation, and naturaliza-
1986]
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eral provisions concerning exclusion, 25  deportation, 26  and
denaturalization. 27 The 1952 Act specifically requires denaturaliza-
tion in certain instances:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respec-
tive districts ... to institute proceedings ... for the purpose of
revoking and setting aside the order admitting such persons to
citizenship and cancelling the certificate of naturalization on the
ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were il-
legally procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation. 28
Denaturalization is retroactive. The process determines that a
person was not eligible for citizenship at the time citizenship was
granted. 29 In denaturalization cases, courts look for concealment
of material facts or willful material misrepresentations. 30 The ma-
teriality requirement ensures that misstatements which are uninten-
tion, Congress overrode Truman's veto and passed the act onJune 27, 1952. See R. STEEL,
STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAw § 1.2 (1985).
The Act continues to be the basic immigration law for the United States. For the legis-
lative history and purpose of the Act, see 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 165. For a
general discussion of the Act, see Note, supra note 5, at 473-75.
25 Grounds for exclusion are enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1128. See generally 3 C. GORDON
& H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 10, §§ 2.27-2.41; STEEL, supra note 24, §§ 2.27-2.45A.
26 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1260 (1982). Grounds for deportation are listed in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (1982). The deportation order may be withheld if the alien can demonstrate the
threat of persecution because of race, religion, or political belief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1982). See generally 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 10, § 5; R. STEEL, supra note
24, §§ 14:1 to 14:60.
27 Denaturalization, applicable only to naturalized citizens, entails ajudicial proceeding
premised on impropriety in the naturalization process. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1503 (1982).
See generally 3 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 10, § 20.4; R. STEEL, supra note 24,
§ 1:2. See B. HING, HANDLING IMMIGRATION CASES § 20.2a (1985).
The statutes have never established a time limitation for bringing a denaturalization
suit. Consequently, a naturalized person's citizenship may be subject to revocation at any
time after it is granted. See 3 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 10, § 20.2d. The
courts have consistently rejected contentions that such protracted delay denies due process
of law. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961) (delay of 27 years).
The notion that powers of denaturalization, firmly established and repeatedly en-
dorsed, are unlimited is a misconception. Rights of citizenship are not easily divested. Any
denaturalization proceeding is subject to challenge for arbitrariness, unreasonableness, or
discrimination. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971); Schneider v. Rush, 377 U.S. 163
(1964).
28 8 U.S.C. § 145 1(a) (1982). Illegal procurement, as distinguished from misrepresen-
tation, refers to obtaining a grant of citizenship without first complying with prescribed
statutory requirements. It does not require any affirmative indication of deception. See 3 C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 10, § 20.4c; Note, supra note 5, at 474.
If a person is denaturalized on the basis of an illegally procured entrance visa, deporta-
tion proceedings are likely to result. See R. STEEL, supra note 24, § 15:9. Deportation would
not result from a misrepresentation or concealment in an application for naturalization if
the person held a valid, legally obtained visa. Denaturalization, however, may extinguish
derivative rights to citizenship acquired by the naturalized person's dependants. See 8
U.S.C. § 145(a) & (f) (1982). See also 3 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 10, § 20.6.
29 See generally R. STEEL, supra note 24, § 15:26.
30 See B. HING, supra note 27, § 12.4.
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tional, innocuous, or irrelevant do not jeopardize a naturalized
person's citizenship.3' In light of the severity of denaturalization,
courts have refused to revoke citizenship when the defects are not
substantial.32
III. Judicial Involvement in Denaturalization Proceedings
A. Early Developments
Even though the 1952 Act includes the limitation of material-
ity,33 Congress never defined the term. In 1960, the Supreme
Court fashioned its own definition of materiality. In Chaunt v.
United States,34 the Court established the test for material conceal-
ments and misrepresentations in naturalization proceedings.
In Chaunt, the Government sought to revoke the defendant's
citizenship, contending that the defendant procured his citizenship
"by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresenta-
tion."3 5 Although Peter Chaunt had entered the United States pur-
suant to a valid visa, he failed to reveal a number of prior arrests
when he applied for naturalization.3 6 The Government charged
that the suppressed information would have prompted a further in-
vestigation which would have established the absence of good
moral character required of an applicant by the 1952 Act.37
In resolving the case, the Court first noted that Chaunt had
disclosed his membership in the International Worker's Order
(I.W.O.). Although Chaunt had denied affiliation with the Commu-
nist party, the Court concluded that membership in the I.W.O.
should have prompted further investigation into Chaunt's political
activities.38 Because this disclosure had not prompted further in-
quiry by the Government, the Court found that his undisclosed
31 See Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 659 (1946).
32 See B. HING, supra note 27, § 12.3. The United States Department ofJustice main-
tains that revocation of citizenship by denaturalization is a severe measure and should only
be sought in the most egregious circumstances. See Note, Diminished Protection of Naturalized
Citizens in Denaturalization Proceedings, 14 TE~x. INT'L L.J. 453, 454 (1979) (theJustice Depart-
ment should view revocation as remedial rather than penal in nature and should not insti-
tute denaturalization proceedings unless substantial results are likely to be achieved).
33 See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982).
34 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
35 Id. at 350-51 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982)).
36 Chaunt had been arrested three times: once for distributing handbills in violation of
a local ordinance-he was discharged; once for violating a park regulation prohibiting pub-
lic demonstrations-he received a suspended sentence; and once for breach of the peace-
conviction "nolled" on appeal. See id. at 352.
37 See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982).
38 364 U.S. at 355. Generally, membership in the Communist Party is not per se
grounds for establishing illegal procurement of citizenship. The Government must prove
that the naturalized citizen knows that the Communist Party advocates the overthrow of the
United States Government and that the naturalized citizen supports this goal. See Nowak v.
United States, 356 U.S. 660, 665-68 (1958).
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prior arrests were of slight consequence. 39 "Had [the disclosure of
his membership] not been made in the application, failure to report
the arrests would have had greater significance." 4 0 The Court con-
cluded by stating that:
[The] Government has failed to show by "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing" evidence either (1) that facts were suppressed
which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship, or
(2) that their disclosure might have been useful in an investiga-
tion possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting
denial of citizenship.4 1
In so holding, the Supreme Court established the test for determin-
ing whether a misrepresentation or concealment is material.42 The
Court found that because Chaunt's omissions were not material, he
could not be denaturalized. 43
The first test of Chaunt reflects the minimum standard for judg-
ing materiality: when the suppressed fact would by itself warrant
denial of citizenship. Any less restrictive standard runs counter to
the fundamental policy consideration of discouraging falsehoods in
the citizenship acquisition process. 44 Failure to meet this standard,
however, does not render the suppressed facts immaterial. A court
must apply the second Chaunt test. While the lower courts have
consistently interpreted the first test, their application of the sec-
ond test has resulted in confusion and inconsistency. 45 Some
courts argue that the Government must show that the undisclosed
facts would have led to the discovery of additional facts warranting
denial of citizenship.46 Other courts maintain that the second test
39 Id. at 354.
40 Id. at 355.
41 Id. The Supreme Court has established that citizenship in the United States is a
precious right. Once conferred, the Government bears "a heavy burden of proof" in denat-
uralization proceedings. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 (1961), quoted in
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505 (1981). To revoke a grant of citizenship, the
evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing. See Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943). "Any less exacting standard would be inconsistent with the im-
portance of the right that is at stake." Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505-06.
42 364 U.S. at 355.
43 Id. at 356.
44 See Comment, Fedorenko v. United States, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 163, 179
(1982).
45 For a discussion of the different interpretations of Chaunt, see Note, supra note 5, at
490-504. The basis for the varying interpretations of Chaunt can be traced back to the
Chaunt decision itself where the dissent proposed its own less restrictive standard. Believ-
ing that the Court had adopted a more restrictive view, Justice Clark stated that the "test is
not whether the truthful answer in itself, or the facts discovered through an investigation
prompted by that answer, would have justified a denial of citizenship. It is whether the
falsification, by misleading the examining officer, forestalled an investigation which might
have resulted in the defeat of petitioner's application for naturalization." 364 U.S. at 357
(Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Sheshtawy, 714 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (10th Cir. 1983); La
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of Chaunt requires only the possibility, and not the certainty, of dis-
covering disqualifying facts sufficient to warrant denial of
citizenship.47
B. Fedorenko v. United States48
Twenty years after the decision in Chaunt, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Fedorenko v. United States,49 apparently to re-
solve the conflict that had arisen among the circuits regarding their
interpretation of the Chaunt materiality test. In 1949, Feodor
Fedorenko applied for a visa to the United States pursuant to the
Displaced Persons Act. He falsely stated on his application that he
had been a farmer from 1937-42 and that he had been deported to
Germany and forced to work in a factory.50 Actually, Fedorenko
was drafted into the Russian army in 1941 and captured by the Na-
zis shortly thereafter. After a brief period in prisoner-of-war
camps, the Germans selected Fedorenko for training as a concen-
tration camp guard at Treblinka, Poland.51 As a camp guard,
Fedorenko wore a uniform, carried a rifle, received a stipend, ob-
tained a "good service stripe" from the Germans 5 2 and allegedly
committed acts of violence against camp inmates. 53
Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rieler, 337
F.2d 986, 989 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1962).
See also Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 524 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 515-16 (3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert, C.J.,
dissenting).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1319-20 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 130 (1984); United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1979), affd on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 490 (1981); Kassab v. INS, 364 F.2d 806, 807 (6th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115, 118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963).
48 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
49 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980), afd on other grounds,
449 U.S. 490 (1981).
50 449 U.S. at 498.
51 Id. Historians estimate that some 800,000 people were murdered at Treblinka. See
L. DAWIDOWIcz, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEW, 1933-1945, at 149 (1975); R. HILBERG, THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 572 (1978). The district court in Fedorenko described
Treblinka as follows:
It contained only living facilities for the [Schutzstaffel (SS)] and the persons work-
ing there. The thousands who arrived daily on the trains had no need for barracks
or mess halls; they would be dead before nightfall. It was operated with a barba-
rous methodology-brutally efficient-and such camps surely fill one of the
darkest chapters in the annals of human existence, certainly the darkest in that
which we call Western civilization.
Fedorenko v. United States, 455 F. Supp. 893, 901 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1978). For a discussion
of the conditions ofJewish ghettos established by the Nazis to aid in the implementation of
their brutal pogroms, see United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 59-63, 83-96 (E.D. Pa.
1981).
52 449 U.S. at 494, 500.
53 Id. at 498 & n.12. The Government produced eyewitnesses to testify regarding
Fedorenko's acts of violence. Id. The defendant himself admitted, however, that as an
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In affirming the lower court's decision, the Fedorenko Court re-
lied on section 10 of the Displaced Persons Act, which provides that
"[a]ny person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the
purpose of gaining admission into the United States shall thereafter
not be admissible into the United States. ' ' 54 The Court had to de-
termine whether misrepresentations or concealments about an ap-
plicant's pre-immigration activities were material in determining
the lawfulness of his entry into the United States. 55 Because of the
implied materiality requirement in section 10, the Court first ad-
dressed whether the materiality test announced in Chaunt applied to
the Fedorenko case. The Court noted that while Peter Chaunt had
legally obtained his visa before concealing facts in the naturaliza-
tion process, Fedorenko had been accused of falsifying his visa ap-
plication. Fedorenko, therefore, posed a different question than
Chaunt.
The Fedorenko Court concluded that it was "unnecessary to re-
solve the question whether the Chaunt materiality test also governs
false statements in visa applications." 56 The Court stated that, at a
minimum, a misrepresentation must be considered material "if dis-
closure of the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible
for a visa." 57  The Court found that the true facts about
Fedorenko's service as an armed guard would have made him ineli-
gible for a visa as a matter of law.58 Fedorenko, therefore, under
armed guard he followed orders as directed, including orders to shoot at escaping prison-
ers. Id. at 500.
54 Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013. Even
though the Act uses "material" only in the context of concealments, courts have implied a
similar requirement for willful misrepresentations. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S.
265, 271-72 (1961).
55 449 U.S. at 509. Several circuits, including the Fifth Circuit's decision in Fedorenko,
see 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), assumed that the Chaunt materiality test also controlled
misrepresentations at the visa stage. See, e.g., Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.
1985); United States v. Palciauskas, 734 F.2d 625, 628 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Kassab v. INS, 364
F.2d 806, 807 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962);
Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642, 648 (1st Cir. 1961).
56 449 U.S. at 509. Accordingly, the Court also found it unnecessary to determine
whether the court of appeals, which adopted the less restrictive view of Chaunt (see text
accompanying note 47 supra), correctly interpreted the Chaunt materiality test. Cf. Fedorenho,
449 U.S. at 523 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I must join the Court in not accepting the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals, which would have diluted the materiality standard.").
Even though the Court refused to address whether the Chaunt test applied to false state-
ments in visa applications, the test established in Fedorenko test is effectively the same as the
first test in Chaunt.
57 449 U.S. at 509.
58 Id. The Court concluded that § 2(a) of the I.R.O. constitution mandated a finding of
ineligibility under the Displaced Persons Act. 449 U.S. at 512. "Section 2(b) of the [Dis-
placed Persons Act] .. .specifically provided that individuals who 'assisted the enemy in
persecuting civil[ians]' were ineligible for visas under the Act." Id. at 509-10. Looking to
Fedorenko's activities, the Court concluded that an individual's service as an armed concen-
tration camp guard-whether voluntary or involuntary-made him ineligible for a visa. Id.
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the express terms of the Displaced Persons Act, was "thereafter not
admissible into the United States." 59
The Court next discussed whether the concealment of a mate-
rial fact would warrant revocation of Fedorenko's citizenship. The
1952 Act provides for the revocation of a person's citizenship for
failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites for naturaliza-
tion.60 To become a naturalized citizen, the 1952 Act, in effect at
the time Fedorenko applied for naturalization, requires an appli-
cant for citizenship to have been lawfully admitted to the United
States for permanent residence.6 1 Section 13(a) of the Immigration
Act of 1924, in effect when Fedorenko received his visa to the
United States, provided that "[n]o immigrant shall be admitted to
the United States unless he . . . has an unexpired immigration
visa." 62
Having failed to obtain a valid visa, Fedorenko did not comply
with the statutory prerequisites, and thereby subjected his citizen-
ship to revocation. 63 In the Fedorenko context, therefore, illegally
procured naturalization means that the party was ineligible for nat-
uralization at the time citizenship was granted.64
IV. The Plight of Serge Kowalchuk
In Chaunt, the Supreme Court established the framework by
which lower federal courts analyze misrepresentations in citizen-
at 512. In comparison, the Court speculated that "an individual who did no more than cut
the hair of (Jewish] female inmates before they were executed [by the Nazis could not] be
found to have assisted in the persecution of civilians." Id. at 512 n.34.
59 Id. at 514 (quoting Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat.
1009, 1013).
60 See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982). See also Note, supra note 22, at 130; B. HING, supra note
27, § 12.3.
61 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1429 (1982). ("No person shall be naturalized unless he has
been legally admitted into the United States for permanent residence in accordance with all
applicable provisions of this chapter." Id. § 1429.) (emphasis added).
62 Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 13(a), 43 Stat. 153, 161 (repealed in
1952). The Immigration and Nationality Act contains the same requirement. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1181(a) (1982) ("No immigrant shall be admitted into the United States unless at the time
of application for admission he... has a valid unexpired immigration visa."). Courts have
consistently interpreted § 13(a) to require a valid visa. Visas obtained through material
misrepresentations are invalid. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 515 (citing Ablett v. Brownell, 240
F.2d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d
580, 582 (2d Cir. 1951)).
63 449 U.S. at 514-15.
64 See R. STEEL, supra note 24, § 15.26. For cases following Fedorenko, see Kowalchuk v.
United States, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986); United
States v. Palciauskas, 559 F. Supp. 1294 (M.D. Fla.), aft'd, 734 F.2d 625 (11 th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Schellong, 717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 1002 (1984);
Demjanjuk v. United States,.518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), afd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982); Dercacz v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 1348
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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ship applications. In Fedorenko, the Court concluded that misrepre-
sentations in visa applications which warrant the denial of an
entrance visa satisfy the materiality requirement. The Court, how-
ever, has yet to decide whether misrepresenting or concealing a fact
in a visa application which would not itself warrant the denial of a
visa satisfies the materiality requirement. Accordingly, citizens, like
Serge Kowalchuk, suffer a miscarriage of justice when courts im-
properly apply Fedorenko to facts markedly different than Fedorenko.
A. The Kowalchuk Decision
Serge Kowalchuk, a Ukrainian, began his immigration process
at an I.R.O. camp in Lexenfeld, Austria. After being deemed "of
concern" to the I.R.O., he applied for and was granted a visa in
1949. Eleven years later, Kowalchuk became a naturalized Ameri-
can citizen.65 In 1981, the United States Government brought de-
naturalization proceedings against Serge Kowalchuk.66
The Government contended that Kowalchuk had served as
deputy commandant for a unit of the local militia in Lubomyl, Po-
land from 1941-44; that the local militia committed acts of atrocity
and repression against LubomylJews; and that as a member of the
militia, Kowalchuk assisted the Nazi cause by allowing German
soldiers to concentrate on the war effort.67 The Government
charged that throughout the entire immigration and naturalization
process, Kowalchuk willfully concealed and intentionally failed to
disclose these facts. 68 Kowalchuk contended that, although he was
employed with the Lubomyl government, his position involved
food distribution and rationing, duties performed at a local food
warehouse. While Kowalchuk admitted he worked for the local mi-
litia, he characterized his duties as merely clerical, namely typing
duty rosters, requisitions, and reports. 69
The Government initiated its denaturalization suit pursuant to
section 340(a) of the 1952 Act.70 Section 340(a) provides for revo-
cation of citizenship if the citizenship or naturalization certificates
were illegally procured or procured through a concealment of a ma-
terial fact or willful misrepresentation.
After evaluating the testimony of the witnesses for each side,7 1
65 United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 74 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
66 See Trial of Ukrainian Immigrant Revives Bitterness on 2 Sides, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1981,
at A18, col. 3.
67 Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 74.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 75.
70 See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982).
71 Because denaturalization proceedings usually occur a considerable time after the rel-
evant period of inquiry, the fact finder is faced with a difficult task. Kowalchuk's case was
no exception: "Unlike virtually every other reported denaturalization case, there is in this
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the district court made several findings. First, as a member of the
local militia, or schutzmannschaft,72 Kowalchuk was not a genuine ref-
ugee "of concern" to the I.R.O. because he "voluntarily assisted
the enemy forces . . . in their operations against the United
States."73 As a result, he was not entitled to the benefits of the
Displaced Persons Act. Second, as a member of the schutzmann-
schaft, Kowalchuk voluntarily assisted the enemy forces in their op-
erations against the United Nations, and assisted the Nazis in
persecuting civilians. Third, the defendant illegally obtained his
visa by willfully misrepresenting material facts to gain admission
into the United States as a permanent resident.74 And, finally, be-
cause Kowalchuk's entry into the United States for permanent resi-
dency was illegal, the defendant illegally obtained his naturalization
certificate. Accordingly, the court revoked Kowalchuk's citizenship
and cancelled his certificate of naturalization. 75
On appeal, Kowalchuk argued that the legal conclusions of in-
eligibility and materiality were not supported by the court's own
findings of fact.76 Focusing upon the statutory contentions raised
on appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to
case not one scrap of documentary evidence relating to the pertinent facts. The fact finder
is relegated entirely to the testimony of witnesses, uncorroborated by any documentary
evidence, and unrefreshed by any contemporaneous or relatively early recordation of their
recollections of the pertinent events." Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 75.
72 The Lubomyl militia was officially known as the schutzmannschaft but is interchangea-
bly referred to as the Lubomyl militia or police force. See 773 F.2d at 490 n.2.
73 Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 82. The district court analyzed Kowalchuk's I.R.O. and
Displaced Persons Act eligibility applications and concluded that he had made five false or
misleading statements: (1) he concealed his employment with the militia; (2) he concealed
his residence at Lubomyl by falsely stating that he resided in Kremianec; (3) he misrepre-
sented his education by concealing that his schooling was provided by the Nazis; (4) he
concealed his voluntary departure with the Germans; and (5) he concealed his membership
with the military when asked whether he was a member of any political, non-political, or
paramilitary organization. Id. at 492.
Although the Government's complaint cited only misrepresentations concerning
Kowalchuk's militia membership and residence in Lubomyl, the court of appeals found that
the other allegations were undisputed. Id. at 492 n.6.
74 Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 82-83. The district court concluded that the defendant
had plainly made misrepresentations on his visa, even though the information from his
personal history form was most likely merely copied onto the visa application. Such inac-
tion, however, does not excuse a defendant from the responsibility of submitting an accu-
rate application. Id. at 82.
75 Id. at 83.
76 773 F.2d at 492. Kowalchuk also argued that he had not been afforded due process
of law as he was unable to investigate his case and interview favorable witnesses residing in
Soviet controlled territory. Id.
Because the focus of this article is denaturalization of persons admitted under the Dis-
placed Persons Act, and because the district and appellate court decisions were based upon
statutory grounds, the due process analysis, treated at great length by the dissent, is beyond
the scope of this article. This does not, however, imply that the due process claim was
frivolous. See Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 498-507 (Aldisert, Cj., dissenting), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1188 (1986).
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revoke Kowalchuk's citizenship. 77 In its analysis, the court detailed
the role of the local militia in Lubomyl and its crucial importance to
the Germans in carrying out the policies of the Nazi army. Accord-
ing to the majority, the Germans organized the schutzmannschaft "to
carry on the functions of government and to enforce the obser-
vance of restrictive edicts."78 This enabled the German forces to
carry out their repressive and brutal policies while simultaneously
waging an aggressive military campaign. 79
The Third Circuit found that Kowalchuk's membership in the
Lubomyl militia constituted voluntary assistance to the enemy ac-
cording to sections 22 and 27 of the I.R.O. procedure manual.
These sections stated that "assistance to the enemy shall be pre-
sumed to have been voluntary" by a member of either "the police,
para-military [or] auxiliary organizations." 80 An applicant had the
burden to disprove the voluntary nature of his enlistment once
membership in one of the organizations was established.8 1
The court of appeals found that Kowalchuk did not overcome
the presumption of voluntariness. The court concluded that the
provisions of the I.R.O. Constitution "convincingly demonstrate
that the defendant's voluntary membership in the Ukrainian
schutzmannshaft constituted voluntary assistance to the enemy." 82
Because he was not "of concern" to the I.R.O., Kowalchuk was not
an eligible displaced person. The concealment of his membership
in the schutzmannschaft, therefore, invalidated his visa. As a result,
Kowalchuk's citizenship could be revoked under Fedorenko v. United
States.8 3
B. Criticism of the Court's Analysis
The court's conclusion that disclosure of Kowalchuk's wartime
77 Id. at 498.
78 Id. at 490 (quoting United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1983)).
79 Id.
80 773 F.2d at 494 n.7. But see id. at 509 n.8 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting) ("it is not at all
clear from the evidence that the presumption spawned from the manual was actually in use
at the time of Kowalchuk's visa application").
81 Id. The restrictions were confirmed by the testimony of three Government wit-
nesses. Michael R. Thomas, Chief Eligibility Officer for the I.R.O. in 1948, testified that
membership in a police force raised a presumption of voluntary assistance to the enemy.
Id. at 494. A.P. Conan, Senior Officer for the Displaced Person Commission in charge of
activites for the British zone between 1948 and 1952, stated that a member of the Ukrainian
schutzmannschaft would be rejected unless he overcame the presumption of ineligibility by
showing that his service was involuntary. Id. Finally, Professor Raul Hilberg, a leading au-
thority on the Holocaust, testified that auxiliary forces such as the Lubomyl militia were of
such great importance to the German forces that the I.R.O. included police, paramilitary,
and auxiliary organizations in its definition of "enemy forces," a category of individuals not
"of concern" to the I.R.O. Id.
82 Id.
83 449 U.S. 490 (1981). See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
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NOTES
activities would have warranted the denial of his visa is nothing less
than intellectual bootstrapping.8 4 The majority relies on the con-
cealment of Kowalchuk's voluntary wartime activities as the basis
for determining illegal procurement of the visa. As the present
state of law exists, a misrepresentation or concealment must be ma-
terial to be relevant to a finding of illegal procurement.8 5 False
statements are considered material in visa applications "if disclo-
sure of the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a
visa."8 6 In other words, the suppressed fact must itself warrant the
denial of the visa application. The Supreme Court has yet to estab-
lish the materiality standard for misrepresentations or conceal-
ments which would not by themselves warrant the denial of a visa
application. Contrary to the Third Circuit's conclusion, disclosure
of the true facts would not have made Kowalchuk ineligible for a
visa.
The court cited the testimony of government witnesses87 and
sections 20, 22, and 27 of the I.R.O. procedure manual to support
their conclusions. These sources establish that disclosure of
Kowalchuk's membership in the schutzmannschaft would not have
made him per se ineligible. As the court itself noted, disclosure of
membership would have merely raised a rebuttable presumption of
voluntariness, 88 or, in other words, a rebuttable presumption of in-
eligibility. The district court found that membership in or employ-
ment by the schutzmannschaft would not preclude the issuance of a
visa. It did find that disclosure of Kowalchuk's membership would
at least have prompted further inquiry.89 The Fedorenko test for ma-
teriality, however, is limited to disclosure of facts which would have
made the applicant ineligible for a visa. Because the disclosure of
Serge Kowalchuk's membership in the schutzmannschaft would not
have made him ineligible as a matter of law, the Fedorenko test is
inapposite to the Kowalchuk case.
Judge Aldisert, dissenting in Kowalchuk, rejected the majority's
analysis regarding voluntary assistance to the enemy.90 The dissent
84 The court stated that had "Kowalchuk revealed the facts which he suppressed on
December 29, 1949, the day he obtained his visa, those facts would have warranted the
denial of his visa and thereby precluded him from obtaining citizenship." Kowalchuk, 773
F.2d at 496.
85 See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
86 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 509.
87 See note 81 supra.
88 See Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 494.
89 Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 82.
90 See Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 508 (Aldisert, GJ., dissenting). Judge Aldisert stated that
the presumption utilized by the majority should be ignored because its application violates
due process. Id. at 510 (Aldisert, GJ., dissenting). Judge Aldisert charges that the majority
has allowed the Government to sidestep its "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" burden of
proof by shifting the presumption of voluntariness onto the applicant. Id. at 508. He ar-
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analyzed section 2(b) of the I.R.O. Constitution, focusing on an ex-
planatory footnote regarding what constitutes voluntary assistance
to the enemy:
Mere continuance of normal and peaceful duties, not performed
with the specific purpose of aiding the enemy against the Allies
or against the civil population of territory in enemy occupation
shall not be considered to constitute "voluntary assistance."9 1
The dissent concluded that "assistance to the enemy... must have
been voluntary, and given deliberately and of [a person's own free
will], with the specific purpose of aiding the enemy in their military
gued that "[n]o authority sanctions such glib reallocation of Supreme Court imposed bur-
dens of proof." Id.
The dissent stated that because "denaturalization procedures are akin to criminal pro-
cedures," the body of case law regarding the use of presumptions in the criminal context
applies to the Kowalchuk case. Id. at 508-09. "[T]he Supreme Court has determined that the
use of a presumption by the government violates due process." Id. (citing Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215-16 (1977);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701, 704 (1975)). Accordingly, the dissent found that
the presumption relied upon by the majority should be ignored. Id. at 509.
The fundamental problem with the dissent's analysis is its premise that Mullaney-Patter-
son applies to the Kowalchuk case. A close reading of the Mullaney and Patterson cases suggest
that the dissent's premise is incorrect. The Mullaney-Patterson doctrine stands for the propo-
sition that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt any factor in a criminal case
which was an express or implied element of the crime charged. The defendant must not
carry the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime. For a general discussion
of Mullaney-Patterson, see Dutile, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Comment on the Mulla-
ney-Patterson Doctrine, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 380 (1980).
Consequently, if Mullaney-Patterson applies to Kowalchuk, a due process violation exists.
The I.R.O. excludes from consideration persons who provided voluntary assistance to the
enemy. Sections 20, 22, and 27 mandate a presumption of voluntariness in the event that
the government establishes membership in one of several organizations. To overcome the
presumption, the applicant must prove that his membership was involuntary. Thus, the
dissent argues, the applicant must disprove voluntariness, an essential element, in violation
of Mullaney-Patterson.
According to the majority, Kowalchuk failed to overcome the presumption and was
therefore ineligibile. The failure to prove eligibility, however, does not violate a statute.
Kowalchuk was not a criminal nor was he punished in any legal sense. The Supreme Court
has held that no person "has the slightest right to naturalization unless all statutory re-
quirements are complied with; and every certificate of citizenship must be treated as
granted upon condition that the government may challenge it... and demand its cancella-
tion unless issued in accordance with such requirements." United States v. Ginsberg, 243
U.S. 472, 475 (1917), quoted in Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1982). But
see Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505 ("the right to acquire American citizenship is a precious one and
that once citizenship has been acquired, its loss can have severe and unsettling conse-
quences") (emphasis added). Because an applicant does not possess a right to naturaliza-
tion, failure to establish eligibility does not result in the deprivation of a right-a
fundamental basis for a due process violation. Denaturalization merely deprives the natu-
ralized person "of a privilege that was never rightfully his." Johannessen v. United States,
225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912). Thus Mullaney-Patterson does not apply to naturalization proceed-
ings, for no criminal violation occurs when an applicant fails to overcome a presumption.
91 Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 509 (Aldisert, CJ., dissenting) (quoting LR.O. Const., supra
note 12, at 3052 n.1).
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operations against the Allies." 92 Because the government failed to
produce evidence at trial regarding "intent to assist," the dissent
found that the government had not met its "heavy burden of prov-
ing voluntariness." 93 Accordingly, the dissent correctly concluded
that the findings of voluntary assistance to the enemy and material
misrepresentations of fact were clearly erroneous. 94
V. The Remedy: Extending the Application of the Chaunt
Materiality Test
The conclusion that the Government failed to meet its burden
of proving the voluntariness of Serge Kowalchuk's activities does
not terminate the inquiry. The question remains whether
Kowalchuk's "statements about his residence and occupation dur-
ing the war were misrepresentations of material fact sufficient to
have denied him a visa under the [Displaced Persons Act]." 9 5
When the Supreme Court decided Fedorenko, the Justices spe-
cifically found it "unnecessary to resolve the question whether the
Chaunt materiality test also governs false statements in visa applica-
tions." 96 The Fedorenko test is limited to the disclosure of facts
which "would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa." 97 Con-
sequently, the question remains open regarding the materiality of
facts which standing alone would not result in a finding of
ineligibility.
Although the Supreme Court declined to extend Chaunt to visa
applications, an analysis of that case and its progeny reveals a com-
mon concern regarding false statements in citizenship applications
and visa applications: the government's unquestionable right to
thoroughly investigate an applicant to avoid mistaken visa or citi-
zenship grants. 98 Although Chaunt dealt with omissions in the citi-
zenship application process, "nothing in the language or import of
the statutes suggests that omissions or false statements should be
assessed differently when they are tendered upon initial entry into
this country." 99 No apparent reason exists for distinguishing be-
tween the various stages of the naturalization process. Accordingly,
the Chaunt materiality test should be applied to misrepresentations
and concealments in visa applications.
The Chaunt test for materiality requires the Government to
92 773 F.2d at 510 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 513.
95 Id. at 513.
96 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 509. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
97 Id.
98 See Comment, supra note 44, at 180.
99 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 519 (BlackmunJ., concurring).
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show that the suppressed or misrepresented facts "would have war-
ranted denial of citizenship or ...might have been useful in an
investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts war-
ranting denial of citizenship." 100 The first test of Chaunt resembles
the Fedorenko materiality test: where the suppressed fact itself war-
rants denial of citizenship. The analysis of materiality is therefore
the same. Disclosure of Kowalchuk's membership in the
schutzmannschaft would not by itself have made him ineligible for a
visa. 101 The first test of Chaunt, therefore, is not met. The second
test of Chaunt presents a more difficult analysis. As previously
noted, the courts are divided over the interpretation of the second
test. 0 2 The courts differ as to whether Chaunt requires the cer-
tainty103 (more restrictive view) or the possibility10 4 (less restrictive
view) of discovering facts sufficient to warrant denial of citizenship.
An analysis of the policies and interests at stake helps resolve
this dispute. The competing interests in denaturalization proceed-
ings include those of the Government and those of the naturalized
citizen. The Government is committed to supervising the citizen-
ship process to prevent fraudulent concealments or misrepresenta-
tions which allow an otherwise ineligible party to gain admission to
the United States or acquire American citizenship. The naturalized
person, on the other hand, seeks to preserve his status as a citizen,
"a right conferring benefits of inestimable value upon those who
possess it."105 It is necessary, therefore, to balance the need for
honesty in naturalization proceedings and the need to protect the
naturalized citizen,' 0 6 especially in light of the severity of
denaturalization. 10 7
In denaturalization proceedings, the Government must prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence must be clear,
unequivocal, and convincing for the Government to revoke a grant
of citizenship. 0 8 These considerations, coupled with the Supreme
100 Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 355.
101 See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
102 See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
103 See note 46 supra.
104 See note 47 supra.
105 Fedorenho, 449 U.S. at 522 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
106 See Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 352-53. See also Note, Concealment of Facts Forestalling an Investi-
gation in Denaturalization Proceedings, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 588, 596 (1980); Comment, supra
note 44, at 172.
107 See note 28 supra. On February 28, 1986, the Justice Department announced that
Serge Kowalchuk had been arrested and that deportation proceedings would begin against
him for falsifying his visa application. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1986, at 3, col. 4.
Kowalchuk's arrest came a day after the United States Justice Department extradited John
Demjanjuk to Israel to stand trial for crimes against humanity. Demjanjuk was denatural-
ized for concealing his involvement in the murder of thousands of Jews at the Treblinka
death camp. Id.
108 See note 41 supra.
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Court's own recognition that citizenship is a previous right, 09 dic-
tate the adoption of the more restrictive construction of the second
test of Chaunt. 110 That is, the Government should be required to
prove that the undisclosed facts would have led to the discovery of
additional facts which would warrant denial of citizenship.
Two factors indicate that the Chaunt Court intended to adopt
the more restrictive view."' First is the Chaunt Court's own reitera-
tion of the two tests: whether the suppressed facts "might in and of
themselves justify denial of citizenship [or] disclosure of the true
facts might have led to the discovery of other facts which would jus-
tify denial of citizenship." '"1 2 The term "might" suggests a "possi-
bility" standard rather than a "certainty" standard. The Court,
however, uses the term "might" in its elaboration of both tests,
even though it is undisputed that the first test requires the exist-
ence of facts which would warrant the denial of citizenship. More-
over, in the second test, the term "might" likely refers to the
"discovery of other facts" which "would justify denial of citizen-
ship." In other words, the second test "simply asks whether knowl-
edge of the suppressed facts could have enabled the Government to
reach the ultimate disqualifying facts whose existence is now
known." 113
Second, no decision before Chaunt suggested that a naturalized
citizen would be reduced to alien status on the mere suspicion that
certain undisclosed facts might have warranted denial of citizen-
ship. Prior to Chaunt, the Supreme Court consistently maintained
that denaturalization would only be possible upon a clear and con-
vincing showing that the statutory prerequisites of citizenship had
not been met.' '4 By allowing revocation on less than the existence
of facts which would necessitate revocation, a court places "the
valid rights of citizenship in danger of erosion"' ' 5 and reduces nat-
uralized citizenship to nothing more than "citizenship in attenu-
ated, if not suspended, animation." 1 6
The argument that a restrictive standard which allows minor
misrepresentations and concealments to go unpunished will en-
109 See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 365, 269 (1961).
110 See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text. For further commentary on the second
te~t of Chaunt, see generally Note, supra note 5; Appleman, Misrepresentation in Immigration
Law: Materiality, 22 FED. BJ. 267 (1962); Note, supra note 19.
111 See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 523-25 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
112 Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 352-53.
113 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 524 n.13 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 524 (citing Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660, 663-68 (1958); Knauer v.
United States, 328 U.S. 654, 656-69 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,
66,6-78 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 131-59 (1943)). See also Note,
sufra note 22, at 132.
115 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 526 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
116 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 166 (1943) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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courage citizens to lie is unpersuasive. Falsifying statements in im-
migration proceedings is a severe matter. Indeed, the Supreme
Court stated that "[f]ull and truthful response[s] to all relevant
questions required by the naturalization procedure is ... to be ex-
acted, and temporizing with the truth must be vigorously discour-
aged."' I 17 The potential threat of encouraging citizens to lie,
however, is easily outweighed by the confidence that naturalized
citizenship is well beyond the danger of unwarranted revocation. IS
While this approach makes it more difficult for the government to
police the naturalization process, fairness to naturalized citizens de-
mands it.
The government should, therefore, be required to prove the
"existence of disqualifying facts, not simply facts that might lead to
hypothesized disqualifying facts.""t 9 The district court declared
that it was "not at all clear that, in 1949, membership in ... the
schutzmannschaft at Lubomyl would have precluded the issue of a
visa."' 120 Government witnesses testified that membership would
have raised a presumption of voluntary assistance to the enemy and
prompted further investigation. 12 ' The Government did not estab-
lish, by clear and convincing evidence, that any investigation would
have resulted in the denial of Kowalchuk's visa. Consequently, the
government did not fulfill the second test of Chaunt.' 22 Had the
Third Circuit applied the Chaunt tests and not merely the Fedorenko
test, it would have concluded that the district court's finding of
Kowalchuk's voluntary assistance to the enemy was clearly errone-
ous. By applying the Fedorenko test, the Third Circuit effectively ig-
nored the materiality requirement and allowed the Government to
revoke Kowalchuk's citizenship on the basis of facts which were in-
sufficient to warrant revocation.
VI. Conclusion
The Chaunt Court recognized that citizenship for a naturalized
117 Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 352.
118 See Comment, supra note 44, at 179; United States v. Sheshtawy, 714 F.2d 1038, 1041
(10th Cir. 1983); Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 515-16 (Aldisert, CJ., dissenting).
119 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 524 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
120 Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 82.
121 Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 494.
122 If the less restrictive (the possibility of denial) view of Chaunt were adopted, the Gov-
ernment would most likely have met its burden of proof. The proof of a rebuttable pre-
sumption of ineligibility, though not sufficient to prove that Kowalchuk would have been
denied citizenship, is sufficient to meet the burden of proving the "possibility of denial."
For reasons outlined above, however, the less restrictive view fails to consider important
policy considerations at stake and therefore should not be adopted. Additionally, as the
dissent in Kowalchuk notes, it was not clear from the evidence that the presumption relied
upon by the majority was actually in use at the time Kowalchuk applied for his visa. See
Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 509 n.8 (Aldisert, CJ., dissenting).
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person is a treasured possession. Accordingly, the Court estab-
lished the two rigid tests for determining the materiality of false
statements in a citizenship application. Even though the Court for-
mulated the Fedorenko test for visa applications, the test does not
adequately address all fact situations which arise. Serge
Kowalchuk's case is exemplary.
Cases like Serge Kowalchuk's mandate the extension of the
materiality standard established in Chaunt to the visa context. Pol-
icy considerations dictate that the more restrictive view of Chaunt
should be adopted to protect the valued rights of a naturalized per-
son's citizenship. Any less restrictive test enables a court to revoke
a naturalized person's citizenship on the basis of omitted facts
which would not have warranted denial of citizenship had they been
revealed in the visa application. The application of the Chaunt tests
to visa applications ensures that the rights of citizenship are not
subject to the risk of unwarranted revocation.
Matthew E. Steinmetz
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